
Phantom energy

Small modular reactors and data centres

NOVEMBER 2026



AUSTRALIAN CONSERVATION FOUNDATION

Nature needs us, now

We acknowledge the Traditional Owners of Country and their continuing connection to land, waters and community. **We pay respect to their Elders past and present** and to the pivotal role that First Nations Peoples continue to play in **caring for Country across Australia.**

Phantom Energy | Small Modular Reactors and Data Centres *by Jim Green*

Cover image. Data Centre in Melbourne, Australia. *Photo*. Shutterstock
Contents image. Data Centre in Victoria, Australia. *Photo*. Shutterstock

Contents

1. Introduction 4

2. Small modular reactors 5

2.1 Introduction 5

2.2 The failure of large reactor projects 5

2.3 Global status of SMR projects 6

2.4 SMR economics 8

2.5 Potential uses of SMRs 9

3. Powering data centres 11

3.1 International experience powering data centres 11


3.2 Nuclear projects for data centres 12

3.3 Australian experience powering data centres 13

3.4 Promotion of nuclear power to power data centes in Australia 13

4. Nuclear is no solution 14

References 16



1. Introduction

No small modular reactors (SMRs) are operating commercially anywhere in the world. They are not powering homes, industries or data centres. No factories exist to mass produce them. Despite decades of research and hype, SMRs remain largely concepts, prototypes and demonstration projects rather than proven energy technologies.

SMRs were promoted as a solution to the cost overruns and delays that plagued large nuclear projects during the nuclear renaissance of the 2000s. Yet commercial deployment has remained perpetually out of reach, with promises repeatedly made but consistently delayed.

Australian voters rejected the Coalition's nuclear power policy at the May 2025 election, with analysis suggesting it may have contributed to the loss of around 11 seats.[1] The Coalition's own post-election review found the policy was widely viewed as 'politically mistimed or alienating'[2] and particularly unpopular with women.


The South Australian Liberal Party acted quickly, abandoning its pro-nuclear policy just two days after the election. The federal Coalition, however, has continued to promote nuclear power as a central part of its energy policy, despite the clear electoral backlash and concerns raised in its own review.

SMRs are presented as a solution to Australia's future energy needs, but they remain a theoretical answer to a very real and rapidly growing challenge: decarbonising the electricity system while meeting increasing demand from electrification, industry and data-intensive technologies. This report examines claims that nuclear power, and SMRs in particular, could or should play a role in Australia's energy future, including proposals to use them to power data centres.

Australia has more than 160 operating data centres, with many more planned. Their rapid expansion raises concerns about energy demand, water use, health impacts, electricity prices and the growth of AI.

The International Energy Agency projects that renewables will provide around two-thirds of new electricity generation for data centres between 2024 and 2035, compared with just 6% from nuclear. Much of that projected nuclear contribution relies on SMRs, a technology that remains commercially unproven.

The push for nuclear-powered data centres risks distracting from the urgent task of rapidly decarbonising the energy system. Nuclear power is too slow, dangerous, unpopular, expensive, water-intensive and politically contentious to meet Australia's near-term energy needs. SMRs face an additional problem: they do not yet exist as a commercial technology.




Transmission lines lead to Melbourne, Australia. *Photo:* Shutterstock.

2. Small Modular Reactors

2.1 Introduction

Small modular reactors (SMRs), by definition, have an electrical generating capacity of <300 megawatts (MW), whereas conventional large reactors typically have a capacity of around 1,000 MW. The term 'modular' refers to the possibility of serial factory production of reactor components with simple 'plug and play' assembly at the reactor site: theoretically, this could reduce costs. The term 'modular' can also refer to the option of building multiple small reactors at the same site, such as NuScale's abandoned plan to build six 77-megawatt reactors at one site in Idaho.

Using the above definition, no SMRs exist anywhere in the world. Some small reactors exist and a small number are under construction. But no country has the facilities for serial factory construction of reactor components — a prerequisite to achieve mass production and thereby reduce costs.



Plans for an SMR facility. *Photo.* Office of Energy Development, Utah USA

2.2 The failure of large reactor projects

The promotion of SMRs has not been driven by technological advances, nor by market gaps. Instead, it is primarily a reaction to the spectacular failure of large-reactor construction projects. A few examples:

- In the US state of South Carolina, a twin-reactor project was abandoned in 2017 after A$12.6 billion was wasted on the project.
- In the US state of Georgia, a twin-reactor project[3] reached completion in 2023, 6–7 years behind schedule and at a cost of A$24 billion per reactor – 12 times higher than early estimates.
- In the UK, the Hinkley Point twin-reactor project[4] was meant to be complete in 2017 but construction didn't even begin until 2018. The latest cost estimate is A$47 billion per reactor – 11.5 times higher than early estimates. The planned Sizewell C project[5] is likely to be even more expensive at A$49 billion per reactor.
- In France, the only recent domestic reactor construction project[6] has also been a disaster: costs increased six-fold to A$31 billion for a single reactor, and the project was 12 years behind schedule.

Globally, nuclear power generation has been stagnant[7] for the past 25 years. The number of countries building power reactors has fallen[8] from 16 to 14 over the past three years. Nuclear power accounts for just 8.7%[9] of global electricity generation – less than half its historic peak of 17.5%. While the nuclear share continues to decline, renewables are booming: the International Energy Agency projects the share of renewables in global electricity generation to rise from 32% in 2024 to 43% by 2030.[10]

China is the only country with a significant domestic reactor construction program. Over the past 20 years, the number of operating reactors in China has increased by 53 but in the rest of the world there has been a net decline of 55 reactors.[11] Even in China, the expansion of nuclear power is dwarfed by renewables. Nuclear power's share of electricity generation has fallen for four years in a row after peaking at 5.0% in 2021.[12]

2.3 Global status of SMR projects

Operating SMRs

No SMRs exist anywhere in the world. Even using a loose definition – ignoring the concept of mass production and modular construction techniques – there are only two operating SMRs,[13] one each in China and Russia. They could not even be called prototype SMRs since there are no plans to mass-produce these reactor types using serial factory production methods.

The so-called SMRs in China and Russia were long delayed and well over-budget. Both have badly underperformed since they began operating.[14]

Planning for China's so-called SMR (a twin-reactor high-temperature gas-cooled reactor – HTGR) began in 2001, construction began in 2012[15] and the expected completion date was 2016. However commercial operation did not commence until December 2023.[16] Thus, planning to commercial operation spanned 22 years, and construction took 11 years, as opposed to the initial four-year schedule. The cost was three times higher than a cost estimate from Tsinghua University researchers, and two to three times higher than the cost-per-kW of China's larger Hualong reactors. A senior official at the China Electric Power Promotion Council said in 2021 that HTGRs would never be as cheap as conventional light-water reactors.[17] China dropped plans to manufacture 18 to 20 HTGRs after levelised cost estimates (i.e. the cost per unit of power) rose to levels higher than conventional large reactors.

When construction of Russia's floating nuclear power plant (a so-called SMR) began in 2007, completion was anticipated in 2010, but it was not completed until 2019.[18] A three-year construction project became a 12-year project. The eventual cost was six times higher than the initial cost estimate. The OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency estimates that the electricity it produces costs US$200 (A$278) / megawatt-hour (MWh).

To put that in perspective, the Minerals Council of Australia states that SMRs won't find a market unless they can produce power at a cost of A$60–80 / MWh[19] – about one-quarter of the cost of electricity produced by the Russian plant.

SMRs under construction

Only five SMR construction projects are underway worldwide:

- One so-called SMR is under construction at the Darlington[20] site in Canada, with another three planned. [21]
- In 2021, construction of the 300 MW demonstration lead-cooled BREST fast neutron reactor began in Russia.
- In Russia, two floating RITM-200S reactors are under construction.[22]
- In 2021, China began construction of a 125 MW pressurised water reactor. According to China National Nuclear Corporation,[23] construction costs per kilowatt will be twice the cost of large reactors, and levelised costs will be 50% higher than large reactors.
- In 2026, Russian nuclear agencies began construction of a 55 MW reactor in Uzbekistan.[24]

The TerraPower reactor under construction in the US state of Wyoming has been called an SMR, but it does not meet the 'modular' component of the definition of SMRs, nor is it small at 345 MW.

A considerable number of so-called SMRs might be said to be at the planning stage. For example, the company Kairos[25] is building a zero-power demonstration reactor in the US and has also held a 'groundbreaking ceremony' for a 50 MW reactor – but construction of the reactor has not yet begun. Most of the promoters of SMRs in the planning stage have little to show except media releases, PowerPoint presentations, and images of what the reactors might look like if they existed.

Failed SMR projects

In the US state of Idaho, NuScale abandoned its plan for six 77 MW reactors (with a combined capacity of 462 MW) in 2023[26] after cost estimates rose to a prohibitive A$28 billion per gigawatt (GW) and a levelised cost estimate – excluding subsidies – of A$179 / MWh. Even with subsidies amounting to A$6 billion, NuScale was unable to get the project to the construction stage. Analysts at Wells Fargo concluded "we think investor enthusiasm for SMR is misguided."[27]

The NuScale failure led the Australian Coalition parties to abandon their SMR-only policy and to also promote large, conventional reactors despite previously giving them a "definite no".[28]

There are a range of failed SMR projects around the world:

- Argentina began planning an SMR[29] in the 1980s and construction began in 2014, but construction came to a halt in 2024, and the project has been abandoned.[30]
- In France, the Nuward SMR project was suspended in 2024[31] following previous decisions to abandon four other SMR projects (Flexblue, Antares, NP-300 and Astrid).[32]
- The mPower SMR project – a collaboration between Babcock & Wilcox and Bechtel – was abandoned in 2017.[33]
- Transatomic Power gave up on its molten salt reactor R&D in the US in 2018.[34]
- MidAmerican Energy gave up on its plans for SMRs in Iowa in 2013 after failing to secure legislation that would require rate-payers to partially fund construction costs.[35]
- TerraPower abandoned[36] its plan for a prototype fast neutron reactor in China due to restrictions placed on nuclear trade with China by the Trump administration.
- The UK government abandoned consideration of 'integral fast reactors' for plutonium disposition in 2019[37] and the US government did the same in 2015.[38]




CAREM-25 SMR construction site, Atucha, Buenos Aires Province, Argentina.
Construction commenced in 2014 and the project was abandoned in 2024. *Photo.* Google Maps.

2.4 SMR economics

According to the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency,[39] SMRs aim to replace 'economies of scale' with 'economies of multiples' which "depends on the ability to repeat standardised builds across a programme, supported by factory fabrication and delivery models structured around replication."

With no truly modular SMRs yet built and no factories in operation to mass-produce them, the underlying theory remains unproven in practice. The concept looks increasingly uncertain. Despite hundreds of design proposals and dozens of competing companies, no single SMR design or vendor has secured the customer base needed to justify the massive investment required for manufacturing facilities. This reality undermines the central promise of modularity and the economic argument that costs can be significantly reduced through mass production.

CSIRO's 2025-2026 GenCost report[40] demonstrates the inability of nuclear reactors – large or small – to compete economically with renewables. The report presents these levelised cost estimates:[41]



The SMR cost estimate is based on the only SMR under construction in any OECD country: the Darlington project in Canada which for context is estimated at US$14.9 billion for 1.2 GW.

A 2025 report[42] by the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency states that 380 verified SMR financing announcements have been made outside of China and Russia, totalling approximatively US$15.4 billion, of which US$10 billion has come from public sources. [43]

That funding is being spread across many projects. If it was combined to fund a single project, US$15.4 billion might suffice to build about 1 GW of nuclear capacity. That 1 GW would increase total worldwide nuclear power capacity of 380 GW by a fraction of one per cent.

The comparison with renewables is striking. Global new renewable capacity is increasing by 2 GW every single day and the cost is a small fraction of nuclear costs. The US$15.4 billion the NEA says is available for SMR projects outside of China and Russia is a pittance compared to the US$327.5 billion invested in renewables worldwide in just the first half of 2026.[44]

Available construction cost estimates for SMRs further highlight the inability of SMRs to compete economically with renewables.

Energy projects	Capital costs
Canada SMR (first of four units under construction) $C20.9 billion / 1.2 GW[45]	A$28 billion / GW
NuScale SMR (Idaho, abandoned in 2023) US$9.3 billion / 462 MW[46]	A$28 billion / GW
Terrapower nuclear plant under construction in Wyoming US$9.4 billion / 345 MW[47]	A$38 billion / GW
Solar PV large-scale (GenCost[48])	A$1.6 billion / GW
Wind onshore (GenCost[49])	A$3.2 billion / GW

The *Financial Times* reported in August 2026 that "short sellers have reaped large profits from betting against small modular nuclear reactor companies, as the collapse of the "hype cycle" that had sent their share prices soaring wipes billions off their market value. Funds made an estimated US$2.1 billion shorting three SMR stocks – US-listed NuScale Power, Nano Nuclear and Oklo – over the past year."[50]

The *Financial Times* noted the three companies are loss-making, have little or no revenue, and a total of US30.3 billion has been wiped off their collective market value since their peak in October 2025.[51] Meanwhile SMR company X-energy shed US$5.8 billion in market value since the surge that followed its initial public offering in April 2026.[52] Christian Putz, chief executive of investment firm ARR Investment Partners, noted that these SMR companies "have almost zero revenue for the foreseeable future and, on top of that, there are very high capex [capital expenditure] requirements."

SMR startups continue to collapse on a regular basis. Two of the largest European nuclear startups Newcleo (cash shortage) and Naarea (insolvent) are in serious financial trouble.[53] Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation filed for bankruptcy protection in the US in 2024 – just a year after a company representative falsely told an Australian Senate inquiry it was constructing reactors in North America. Moltex Energy Canada is in the hands of insolvency administrators.[54]

2.5 Potential uses of SMRs

Nuclear proponents promote the concept of multipurpose SMRs which could produce electricity, industrial heat, hydrogen, etc. US researchers considered the economics of various SMR configurations – producing process heat for industrial applications; switching SMRs back and forth between electricity generation and water desalination; and deploying SMRs as a source of electrical and thermal energy for US military bases.

But none of those options show promise and the researchers concluded that "several hundred billion dollars of direct and indirect subsidies would be needed to support their development and deployment over the next several decades." [55]

SMRs to power mining operations

Companies like Rolls Royce are promoting SMRs to power mining operations,[56] as are mining lobby groups in Australia[57] and overseas.[58,59] But there are precious few real-world examples of nuclear-powered mining. An exception is Russia's floating SMR, which is used to power fossil fuel mining operations in the Arctic – with several more floating nuclear power plants planned to power remote mining operations.[60]

Mining companies in Australia have shown little or no interest in powering mining operations with nuclear power. For example, Rio Tinto said in 2024[61] that it has no interest in nuclear-powered mining, despite its history as a uranium miner in the NT.

A detailed Canadian study[62] raised numerous serious problems with the idea of using SMRs to power mining operations. The levelised cost of electricity for SMRs would be higher than the cost of wind or solar and higher than diesel-based electricity. Nuclear-powered mining also faces social licence obstacles. For example, the Anishinabek Chiefs-in-Assembly, representing 40 First Nations across Ontario, unanimously expressed opposition to SMRs in 2019.[63]

The concept of nuclear-powered mining faces major hurdles, including the roughly 20-year timeframe needed to develop an SMR, significant safety and security requirements and the long-term costs of reactor decommissioning and waste management after mining operations end. Much like the issues facing nuclear-powered data centres.




Akademik Lomonosov floating nuclear power block. Saint Petersburg, Russia. *Photo.* Shutterstock

3. Powering data centres

3.1 International experience powering data centres

A 2025 report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) explains that global investment in data centres has nearly doubled since 2022 and amounted to half a trillion US dollars in 2024. Also, in 2024 data centres accounted for around 1.5% of the world's electricity consumption, or 415 terawatt-hours (TWh).

Data Centre Energy Demand 2024 415TWh required - % by Country / region. IEA[64]



Data centre electricity consumption has grown by around 12% annually since 2017 and is projected to more than double to around 945 TWh by 2030 (3% of global electricity demand).[65] Less than 10% of global electricity demand growth between 2024 and 2030 is attributed to data centres. The US is expected to account for the largest share of this projected increase 'by far', followed by China.

Global data centre electricity consumption beyond 2030 is more uncertain, but the IEA estimates 1,200 TWh by 2035 in its Base Case – nearly three times the current level – but with a wide range from 700 TWh to 1,700 TWh.[66]

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the biggest driver of projected growth of data centres, the IEA notes, but there are 'large uncertainties' in how quickly AI will be adopted, how capable and productive it will become, how fast efficiency improvements will occur and whether bottlenecks in the energy sector can be resolved.

In the IEA's Base Case, renewables will supply nearly 50% of the growth in data centre electricity demand from 2024-30, while new nuclear plants will supply almost none.

From 2024 to 2035, 320 GW of additional electricity generating capacity is installed to power data centres in the IEA's Base Case, of which renewables account for nearly two-thirds and nuclear just 20 GW or 6%.

Over 80% of that projected new nuclear capacity is projected to come from non-existent SMRs in the US and China. However, there are good reasons to be sceptical about the deployment of significant SMR capacity by 2035. Indeed, the IEA report notes than SMRs "remain to be demonstrated at scale", that "high levelised costs and regulatory hurdles remain significant barriers to deployment", and that "emerging challenges" exist such as "establishing supply chains for the higher-purity fuel needed for SMRs".

Technology companies have "plans to finance more than 20 GW of SMRs to date", the IEA claims. But "plans" should not be conflated with secure funding. Brad Tietz from the US Data Centre Coalition notes that SMRs "are not widely available yet or deployable at this point," pointing to "a multi-year process for regulatory approvals, and then the time it can be needed to scale and make more efficient."

3.2 Nuclear projects for data centres

Several major technology companies, including Microsoft, Google, Amazon and Meta, have announced nuclear energy partnerships to support growing data-centre demand, [67] "committing to more than a dozen agreements worth nearly 10GW of capacity."[68] However, these commitments are largely non-binding agreements, power-purchase arrangements, or modest investments in SMR developers rather than direct funding for reactor construction.

A Carnegie analysis notes that to date AI companies have preferred power purchase offtake agreements – in which a buyer commits to a fixed-price, long-term contract with a power generator to buy electricity – rather than far more expensive and risky direct nuclear ownership or project development.[69] Direct partnerships are mostly with relatively new companies that are developing SMRs, and details are generally opaque.

Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Oracle and NVIDIA have agreements with SMR developers. The Carnegie analysis explains that the terms of agreements are "largely undisclosed" only include modest investment "structured to support early-stage SMR companies rather than fund construction directly." The analysis notes that "Critically, these agreements are contingent on technologies that have not yet been commercialized." [70]

Commenting on the growing hype around nuclear-powered data centres, analysts have observed that "nuclear hype has flowed like champagne at a wedding reception"[71] but that proponents "are all show, with little substance." [72] There are however no SMRs and no large-scale reactors are under construction in the US and plans to restart three shuttered reactors to power data centres face obstacles and delays and only represent a tiny percent of electricity demand for data centres.[73]

Non-binding agreements and modest investment are no substitute for contractual agreements with clear funding commitments. Nuclear funding commitments from Amazon and Google "are just a fraction of one percent of their annual expenditures earmarked for building data centers" and are "primarily meant as greenwashing, in order to divert attention from the negative environmental impacts of data center operations" including much larger fossil fuel investments.[74] Greenhouse emissions from data centres in the US doubled from 2019 to 2023.

The scale of the power demand from data centres has resulted in increases in consumer electricity bills in the US.[75] Electricity from the Natrium and Xe-100 SMR designs would cost at least twice as much as electricity from large nuclear plants,[76] and the cost of electricity from large nuclear plants is at least three times higher than from solar and wind.[77] A 2025 survey found 78% of US adults polled were somewhat or very concerned that new data centres will increase their power bills.[78]

3.3 Australian experience powering data centres

In addition to 165 datacentres already operating around Australia, a further 225 are planned or proposed.[79] In addition to the proliferation of data centres, their average size is increasing to facilitate the development of AI.[80]

Australia was the second largest destination globally for data centre investment after the US in 2024, according to a Westpac analysis, with the local pipeline valued at more than $155 billion.[81]

Approximately 70% of the electricity used to power data centres in Australia now comes from renewable energy sources.[82]

The Australian Energy Market Operator noted in August 2026 that data centre electricity consumption in the National Electricity Market is forecast to increase from approximately 5 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2025□26 to 34 TWh by 2035□36, [83] increasing from 2.8% to approximately 13% of electricity supplied through the grid.[84] Electricity consumption for data centres is heavily skewed to NSW (66%) and Victoria (30%).[85]

A report commissioned by the Clean Energy Finance Corporation states data centre capacity is projected to rise from 1.35 GW today to between 4.7 GW and 7.4 GW by 2035.[86] A Climate Energy Finance article states that if all proposed data centre projects in Australia go ahead, their demand would total more than 21 GW[87] – a similar figure to the capacity of all of Australia's operating coal plants. The Australian Energy Market Operator puts the figure much higher, finding the proposed 225 data centres have a combined capacity of 67 GW.[88]

3.4 Promotion of nuclear power to power data centres in Australia

Several Coalition shadow ministers have promoted nuclear power, particularly SMRs, as a potential energy source for Australia's growing data centre sector. Shadow energy minister Dan Tehan,[89] Nationals deputy leader Darren Chester, [90] shadow minister Andrew Hastie[91] and Liberal senator Jonno Duniam[92] have all argued nuclear power should play a role in supplying electricity for AI and data centres. One Nation[93] has also advocated nuclear power, including micro-reactors and large-scale reactors. [94,95]

However, major obstacles remain. There are popular nuclear power prohibitions under federal law and in several states, including Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria. [96] In addition, SMRs remain an unproven technology. As former Chief Scientist Alan Finkel noted, there are no operating SMRs in any OECD country.[97] Likewise, a 2024 Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering report found SMRs have not yet been proven technically or financially and are not operating in any OECD nation. [98]



Construction of a hyperscale data centre. Queensland, Australia. *Photo.* Shutterstock

4. Nuclear is no solution

Nuclear power is too slow, too expensive, too unpopular, too dangerous and too thirsty to be a viable source of power for data centres in Australia.

Too slow


Based on overseas experience and expert analysis, introducing nuclear power to Australia would likely require around 10 years for planning and licensing,[99] followed by another 10 years for construction.[100] It could take much longer: reactors in France and Finland took 17 years to build, in addition to years of planning.

Nuclear is simply too slow to meet growing data centre demand. SMR advocates claim three to five year construction timelines, but the only SMR-type projects in China and Russia took 11-12 years to build and around two decades from planning to operation.

Too expensive

Data-centre growth is already placing upward pressure on power prices.[101] A 2026 Climate Council report found data centre growth could increase wholesale electricity prices by 26% in NSW and 23% in Victoria by 2035 if demand is met with gas rather than renewables.[102]

Nuclear would not ease these pressures. As discussed in Section 2.3, electricity from SMRs would be far more expensive than renewable energy. Using the Oxford Economics Australia projection of 34 TWh of data-centre electricity consumption by 2050[103] and CSIRO cost estimates, powering data centres with SMRs could cost A$8.5-12.2 billion annually, compared with A$780 million-A$2.0 billion for solar PV.[104]



(AEMO data centre energy demand projections 2050 + CSIRO GenCost levelized cost estimates energy supply 2050.)

Too unpopular

Coupling unpopular nuclear power with unpopular data centres may be a bridge too far as *Crikey* noted in August 2025: "A recent Capital Brief/DemosAU poll[105] found that just 20% of respondents support a nuclear plant in their area, even less than the 23% who would support a data centre (imagine how they'd feel about both at once)."[106]

Langabeer and Ramana write in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*:

"Opposition to data centers [in the US] springs from multiple concerns. A Gallup survey from March 2026[107] found that people opposed data centers because of their effects on resources, such as energy consumption and water usage; the effects on costs, especially utility bills; noise pollution; and concerns about quality of life and economic effects from loss of jobs. Some of these concerns would be accentuated if these data centers are powered by nuclear reactors, which could drive up the costs of electricity because of how expensive it is to build new nuclear plants. Using reactors will also increase the water demand."[108]

Too dangerous

Nuclear reactors would create new safety and security risks and be vulnerable to accidents and attacks. The Nuclear Plume project applied a 30km evacuation zone at the seven reactor sites promoted by the Coalition ahead of the 2025 federal election and found that within the evacuation zones there are 200,000 people, 33 hospitals, 99 schools and 62 childcare centres.[109] The government found that within an 80km radius there are 12,000 farms.[110]

The Australian Security Leaders Climate Group has warned nuclear power stations would become potential targets for missile attacks and sabotage. Former Defence Force chief Chris Barrie argued proposed reactor sites near the coast would be 'clear and accessible' targets in modern conflicts.[111]

"Every nuclear power facility is a potential dirty bomb because rupture of containment facilities can cause devastating damage. Modern warfare is increasingly focused on missiles and uncrewed aerial systems, and with the proposed power stations all located within a 100 kilometres of the coast, they are a clear and accessible target," Admiral Barrie states.[112]

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